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I. Introduction
The issue of "odious debts" requires consideration from to
time in the context of sovereign debt claims, and it has recently
become topical again. The purpose of this article is to review the
literature on odious debt to determine whether there is an
established doctrine of odious debt.
Whether a doctrine of "odious debt" exists and, if it does, what

t Partner, Clifford Chance, LLP.
tt

Lawyer, Clifford Chance, LLP.
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the term "odious debt" means are contentious questions. Even
among the supporters of such a doctrine there is disagreement over
its scope. There is an important distinction to make between the
two types of supporters in order to guide the analysis of the odious
debt issue.
II. The Legal and Political Approaches
The supporters of the odious debt doctrine can be divided into
two groups: those who take the legal approach and those who take
the political approach. Supporters of the Legal Approach seek to
demonstrate that there is a customary rule of international law that
defines and governs odious debt. Supporters of the Political
Approach do not use legal techniques to try to show the existence
of a doctrine of odious debt; instead, they make an argument based
on political principles.
A. The PoliticalApproach
Professor Alexander Sack formulated the classic political
definition in 1927.1 The elements of the definition are: (i) debts are
incurred contrary to the interests of the State; (ii) the creditor
knows that the debt is contrary to the interests of the State; and
(iii) the funds were not spent in the interests and needs of the
State.2 Sack believed that there are two types of odious debt: debts
that are incurred by a despotic power "to strengthen its despotic
regime [in order to] repress the population that fights against it,"3
and ,debts which are "loans incurred by members of the
government or by persons or groups associated with the
government to service interests manifestly4 personal-interests that
are unrelated to the interests of the State.",

1 See generally ALEXANDER SACK, THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON
THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS

AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

(1927)

(writing on the

principle that a state should not be bound to debts which are created against the state's
interest.).
2 PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION AND THE THIRD

WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 164-66 (1991) (citing SACK, supra note 1, at 157-

58).
3 Id. at 165.
4 Patricia Adams, The Doctrine of Odious Debts: Using the Law to Cancel
Illegitimate Debts, Address at the Germany Jubilee Network Seminar (June 21, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/print.cfm?Content
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Patricia Adams suggests that bribes are an example of this
second type of odious debt because they are a "manifestly personal
interest."5 Jeff Rudin adds to the definition of odious debt that
"debts from loans made in breach of international law are
automatically odious." 6 Rudin explains:
[T]he reason for this is that international jurisprudence now
imposes a duty on governments to uphold a core of fundamental
rights or prohibitions. Pre-eminent amongst the prohibitions are
acts of aggression, slavery, genocide and racial discrimination.7
Adams suggests that an international tribunal be established to
deal with odious debt claims.8 Adams believes that Indonesia
should commence arbitration proceedings against the World Bank
in respect of the $30 billion lent to the Suharto government
between 1966 and 1998 as up to $10 billion of that served
"manifestly personal" interests.9
Odious debt is considered an exception to the general principle10
that a new government "automatically and unconditionally"
accepts debts contracted by its predecessor. Sack suggested that a
new government would be required to prove that the debt satisfied
these conditions, which would create a presumption that the debt
was odious.11 It would then be open to the creditor to demonstrate
to an international tribunal that the funds were used to benefit the
territory.12 A debt is odious, and, therefore, non-transferable "if
the previous regime was any form of dictatorship acting contrary
to the needs and wishes of the subjugated population."' 3 This is a

ID=4909).
5

Id. at 2.

Jeff Rudin, Odious Debt Revisited, Jubilee South 6 (2002), available at
http://www.jubileesouth.org/news/EpFVuVkkFlkCCnpoKE.shtml.
7 Id. at 6. Although a rule with strong support, it is not yet clear that the
prohibition on racial discrimination is a rule ofjus cogens. See, e.g., Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 7, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.
277.
8 See ADAMS, supra note 2, at 167.
6

9 See

Adams, supra note 4.

10 See Rudin, supra note 6, at 2.
11 See ADAMS, supra note 2, at 166.
12 See ADAMS, supra note 2, at 167.
13

Rudin, supra note 6, at 2.
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significant difference from the Legal Approach which requires
state-not merely government-succession to trigger an odious
debt classification.14 This difference makes the Political Approach
immediately much wider because situations such as post-invasion
Iraq in 2003 would certainly be within the scope of the theory.
Rudin also suggests that South Africa's conversion from apartheid
in 1994 would be covered. 5
III. Is There an Established Doctrine of Odious Debt?
The Political Approach is not a theory that can be subjected to
serious legal analysis because it is not based on legal principles.
In this context, it is instructive to consider how new legal rules can
be made. It is not contentious to state that any individual country
is free to change its law to make odious debts irrecoverable. For
example, the United States could pass a Federal law to this effect
although it would need to reconcile that law with constitutional
rules protecting property rights (that is, no expropriation without
compensation, as the creditors' rights would be taken away).
However, ultimately Congress could amend the Constitution if
necessary.
In the United Kingdom, Parliament could effectively do the
same by passing a law that all odious debts, however defined, are
irrecoverable. The United Kingdom has no written constitution16
but is subject to the European Convention on Human Rights.
However, as a matter of national law, Parliament could make the
necessary amendments to the Convention.
As alternative approach on the public international law level,
all sovereign nations, or a significant subset of them such as the
G7 and others, could enter into a convention or treaty under which
odious debts are void or could be made void. This is what Sack
wanted. 17
The real point is that neither of these steps, national nor
international, have been taken. Interestingly, there has been a halfhearted attempt by some to pursue the second route in the form of
14 See infra Part II.A.

15 See Rudin, supra note 6, at 9.
16 The UK signed the Convention as a treaty and has incorporated it into domestic
law through an act. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, pt. I, arts. 2-12 (Eng.).
17 See Adams, supra note 4, at 2.
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the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of
State Property. 18 Article 38 of this Convention provides that no
debt passes to successor states unless there is a positive agreement
to this effect. 9 This Convention will be discussed in detail below,
but it should be noted that it has not entered into force and that it is
focused on state succession, rather than regime change. 20 Also, it
deals predominantly with public international law type debts that
are owed by one state to another state or by a state to an
international institution, such as the International Monetary
Fund.2'
In the absence of a convention or treaty or changes in the law
on a national level, subject to a point that will be considered
below, what is left?
The answer is other sources of public international law. For
Europeans, that immediately leads to consideration of the United
Nations and in particular, its judicial arm, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ).
A. The Legal Approach
Some supporters of the odious debt doctrine apply more
sophisticated legal analysis to attempt to prove that a customary
rule of international law exists in respect of odious debt.2 2 In order
to discuss whether the doctrine is a rule of international law, it is
helpful to briefly consider how the rules of international law are
made.
1. Sources of InternationalLaw
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
is accepted as an authoritative statement of the sources of
international law. 23 There are four categories:
18 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property,
Archives and Debts, Apr. 8, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.

Charles Abrahams, The Doctrine of 'Odious Debts' (Aug. 2002) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis, University Lieden, The Netherlands), available at http://www.
odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/ApartheidDebtThesis.pdf.
23 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
22
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a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.24
The supporters of the Legal Approach argue that there is a
customary rule of international law, so there must be "evidence of
a general practice accepted as law. ' 25 The Court has developed
the requirements for a customary rule to be formed in its
jurisprudence.26
The requirements can be summarized as follows:
" The rule must be "in accordance with a constant
and uniform
27
usage practised by the States in question";

"

an indispensable requirement would be that within the
period in question, short though it may be, state practice,
including that of states whose interests are specially
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually
uniform in the sense of the provision invoked, and should
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general
recognition
that a rule of law or legal obligation is
28
involved;
it is "sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general,
be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have

1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents
/index.php?p I =4 &p2 =2 &p3 =0 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
24

Id.

25 Id.; see, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.), 2002
I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of Judge Koroma), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/l 21/8134.pdf (last visited May 1, 2007).
26 See I.C.J. Statute, supra note 23
27

Asylum (Colom. v Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (Nov 20, 1950).

28 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43
(Feb. 20).
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been treated as breaches of29that rule, not as indications of the
recognition of a new rule";
for a new customary rule to be formed, not only must the
acts concerned "amount to a settled practice," but they must
be accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitates. Either
the States taking such action or other States in a position to
react to it must have behaved in such a way that their
conduct is evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The
need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective
element, is implicit
in the very notion of the opiniojurissive
30
necessitate;
"only if... abstention were based on their [the states] being
conscious of having a duty to abstain
would it be possible to
3
speak of an international custom"; '
if an individual state consistently objects to the application
of a rule to its affairs, a specific exemption may be created.
The ICJ has stated in the context of a matter affecting
Norway that "in any event[,] the ...rule would appear to be
inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always
32
opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.,
For a doctrine of odious debt to be accepted as a customary rule of
international law, it must be demonstrated that there is extensive
and virtually uniform state practice, as well as opinio juris
supporting such a rule.3 3
2. The Literature
The doctrine of odious debt has been defined as follows:
"odious debts are those contracted against the interests of the
population of a state, without its consent and with the full

29 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 (June 27).
30 Id. at 108-09.
31 S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7,1927).
32 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18).
33 See Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King & Bryan Thomas, CISDL Working Paper:
Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine 1 (Centre for Int'l Sustainable Dev. L., Mar. 11,
2003), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/AdvancingtheOdiousDebtDoctrine.pdf [hereinafter CISDL].
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34
awareness of the creditor."
The three limbs of the test are explained further as:
Absence of consent-the population must
not have
(i)
35
consented to the transaction in question;

Absence of benefit-there must be 36an absence of
benefit to the population in two ways:
a. the debt is contracted against the interests of the
state; and
b. the proceeds are spent against the interests of the
state; and
(iii)
Creditor Awareness-a subjective test of the
knowledge37of the absence of consent and the absence
of benefit.
The Legal Approach allows for the odious debt theory to be
invoked only when the legal personality of a state changes, for
instance as a result of decolonization, annexation, or dissolution.3 8
Merely a change of government is insufficient.39
Under this approach, once a debt is classified as odious a right
accrues to the debtor state to repudiate the debt unilaterally.4 ° In
practice, most likely, the creditor has no option other than to use
available dispute resolution mechanisms to protect its rights.4 '
The question of whether such a creditor would have a right of set
off against the debtor is not addressed.
(ii)

IV. The Three Types of Odious Debts
Three types of odious debt are identified, and some state
practice has been identified:

34 Id.

35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38

See id., supra note 33, at 2.

39 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 31,47; see also Abrahams, supra note 22, at 53.
40 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 47; see also Abrahams, supra note 22, at 87.
41 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 6-9.
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A. The First Type of Odious Debt
The first type of odious debt that will be considered is hostile
debt: debts that are aggressively against the interests of a
population, such as debts raised to fund conquest, colonization,
war, or suppressing secessionist attempts.42 Three main examples
of hostile debts are cited as evidence of state practice: the Cuban
debts of 1898," 3 Article 254 Treaty of Versailles regarding the
colonization of Poland," and the Treaty of Peace with Italy 10
February 1947. 45
1. The Cuban Debts of 1898
Cuba was a Spanish colony until the Spanish-American War in
1898.46 The Spanish government raised a six percent loan of
620,000,000 pesetas in May 1886 to be serviced and repaid from
the annual budget of Cuba.47 New bonds were issued in 1890 to
cover debts raised between 1886 and 1890 and were sold on the
international market. 48 These debts were owed by Spain and
contracted under Spanish law but were secured on, and paid out
of, the revenues of Cuba.49

The American Commissioners at the peace conference that
lead to the Treaty of Paris 1898 argued that the debts were not
chargeable to Cuba because the debts were created by the Spanish
government for its own purpose, through its own agents and
Creditors knew that the
without consultation with Cuba.50
revenues were pledged to opposing Cuban independence so they
took the risk inherent with security of that nature.5" Spain argued
that the obligations passed to the successor along with

42

Id. at 17.

43

Id. at 25; see also Abrahams, supra note 22, at 35.

See CISDL, supra note 33, at 27; see also Abrahams, supra note 22, at 34.
45 See Abrahams, supra note 22, at 34.
History, http://www.europaworld.com (last
46 See Europa World Plus, Cuba:
visited May 1, 2007) (requires subscription) [hereinafter Cuba History].
44

47 See id.
48

See id.

49 See id.
50

See id.

51 See id.
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sovereignty.5 2

As a result of the Treaty, Cuban sovereignty passed to the
United States, but the United States did not assume obligations for
this debt under the Treaty of Paris and the creditors were not fully
repaid. 3 It is instructive to apply the definition of odious debt to
this example.
If it is accepted that colonial peoples are
disenfranchised and cannot be deemed to consent to any exercise
of sovereignty by the colonial power, the first limb of the
definition is satisfied. It was agreed between the Spanish and
American Commissioners that, before 1860, part of Cuban
revenue had been sent to Madrid and used for national expenses.54
The Spanish did not deny that an increase in Cuban debt between
1861 and 1880 was to fund attempts to secure San Domingo, to
pay for expeditions in Mexico, and to suppress Cuban uprisings
between 1868 and 1878." 5 The second limb of the odious debt
defintion clearly states that the debt must be contracted and spent
against the interests of the state.
Therefore, it would be
insufficient if the debt were not contracted and spent in the
interests of the state; rather, the debt must be actively against the
interests of the state.56 It is questionable whether the first two of
the three purposes were actively against the interests of Cuba,
either when contracted or spent, so whether there is an absence of
benefit is unclear.57 There are also doubts over whether the
bondholders who bought the consolidation issue in 1890 could be
said to know that the funds they provided were put to use
refinancing the debt raised to counter insurgency in Cuba.58 In
1890, Cuba was still part of the Spanish Empire, therefore,
particularly in view of contemporaneous European colonial
empires, it would not be extraordinary for Spain to use revenue
from its colonies to secure debt.59 Thus, it is unclear whether the
third limb of the definition-creditor awareness-is satisfied by
52

See Cuba History, supra note 46.

53

See id.

54 See id.
55
56

See Abrahams, supra note 22, at 39.
See Cuba History, supra note 46.

57 See id.
58

See id.

59

See id.
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the Cuban debt, as part payment of creditors may represent a
political rather than legal settlement.
2. Article 254 Treaty of Versailles
In 1866, significant funding was given to the Prussian
government to purchase Polish estates, followed by additional
funding in 1898 and 1902.60 In 1908, the Prussian government
legislated to allow the expropriation, with compensation, of
Polish-owned estates; an extra 25,000,000 marks were paid into
the fund and an issue of bonds was authorized.61
Following the First World War, under the Treaty of Versailles,
Poland, as a successor state to Germany, assumed only the
German public debts contracted before 1 August 1914.62 Debts
which, in the opinion of the Reparation Commission, were
attributable to measures taken by the Prussian or German
governments to colonize Poland were not assumed by Poland.63
Again, to apply the odious debt test is instructive. It is
arguable that the first limb-lack of consent-would be satisfied
because the debts were incurred during a colonization process.
With regard to the second limb, the absence of benefit, it is unclear
that the purpose of the fund was against the interests of Poland as
distinct from the interests of individual Poles whose property was
expropriated. To accept that it was against the interests of Poland
for estates to be owned by ethnic Germans is to take a position that
is racially discriminatory, which is impossible to justify as a basis
for a rule of law. It is not possible to say whether there was
creditor awareness of the purpose of the funds for either the initial
or subsequent payments into the fund.
3. Treaty of Peace with Italy 1947
The Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission, under the Treaty
of Peace with Italy that followed the Second World War, ruled that
Ethiopia would not have to assume the expenses incurred by Italy

60 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 27.
61 Id.

62 See art. 254 of Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919.

63 Id. at art. 255.
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in subjugating Ethiopia. 64
The first limb, absence of consent, would be satisfied because
funds were used to colonize Ethiopia. 65 As it is accepted that
colonization does not benefit the colonized peoples, the second
limb, absence of benefit, may also be satisfied. However, the
major question of whether the definition applies is whether the
creditors knew of the purpose for the funds. If it is not possible to
identify precisely the funds that were used to subjugate Ethiopia, it
would not be possible to classify the rights of one group of
creditors as 'odious' while leaving the rights of other creditors
unaffected. It is very unclear whether the third limb, creditor
awareness, would be satisfied because of the lack of a clear
purpose for the funds subsequently applied to subjugate Ethiopia
at the time the debt was issued.
B. The Second Type of Odious Debt
The second type of odious debt is war debt: those debts which
are contracted
by the losing state during war, or where war is
66
imminent.
The main example of state practice cited as evidence for war
debts being odious is the British refusal to take on war debts of the
Boer Republics after annexation in 1900.67
Following the Boer War, 1899-1902, the Boer Republics
became British colonies.68 Initially, the Supreme Court of the
Transvaal took the straight state succession approach and held that
the Boer debts raised to fund the war devolved upon Britain as the
new sovereign. 69 However, Britain refused to accept legal
responsibility for public debts incurred in relation to the war as
they were different than other debts.7° Yet, the British government
did ultimately pay ten percent ex gratiaof the value of the bonds.7

64 See Rudin, supra note 6, at 4.
65 Id.
66

See CISDL, supra note 33, at 26; see also Abrahams, supra note 22, at 29.

67 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 26.
68 Id.
69

Id.

70 Id.
71 Id.
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The transfer of debts in the context of the Boer War was
further considered by the English courts.72 The South African
Republic had seized gold belonging to the claimant in a manner
alleged to be unlawful under the South African laws in force at the
time. 73 The claimant sought to recover the gold or compensation
from Britain.74 The court held that Britain had no liability because
a "conquering Sovereign, when making peace, can make any
conditions he thinks fit respecting the financial obligations of the
conquered country,
and it is entirely at his option to what extent he
75
them.,
adopt
will
Any attempt to apply the definition must fall at the paradox
created by its first and second limbs, absence of consent and
absence of benefit. If the debts contracted by a colonial power on
behalf of a colony, such as the Cuban debts above, are deemed to
lack necessary consent from, and be hostile towards, the
population, then it cannot follow that debts contracted by a state
prior to colonization are also deemed to lack consent and are
hostile to the population. It is possible that the third limb, creditor
awareness, was satisfied because of the situation at the time the
debt was raised.
The British position is based upon the rights of a conquering
sovereign.76 There is no attempt to apply the definition of odious
debt and the position taken is much broader as it is not limited to
debts that satisfy all limbs of the definition.77 Accordingly, these
debts cannot be classified as odious within the definition
suggested by the Legal Approach.
C. The Third Type of Odious Debt
The third type of odious debt is developing world debt not in
the interests of the population:
modem "dictators' debts"
including proceeds spent on personal items, used to fight unjust
72 West Rand Central Mining Co., Ltd. v. The King, (1905) 2 L.J.K.B. 391 (Eng.).
73 Id. at 391-93.
74 Id. at 393.

75 Id. at 402.
76 Id.

77 See id. The court says that conditions can be made by a conquering Sovereign
concerning the general financial obligations, without limiting those financial obligations
to any sort of definition. See id.

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
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wars or distributed in a discriminatory fashion.78 The writers who
take the Legal Approach do not cite any examples of state practice
to support this category because of the limitation that a doctrine of
odious debt can only be invoked on state succession rather than
regime change.79 However, dictators' debts have been considered
by arbitration tribunals in Costa Rica v. Great Britain and World
Duty Free Limited v. Republic of Kenya.8 °
1. Costa Rica v Great Britain (1923)
The arbitration in Costa Rica v. Great Britain concerned
banking transactions by the government of President Tinoco.8"
Bills drawn by the Finance Minister on Banco Internacional de
Costa Rica were paid in to the credit of the government with the
Royal Bank of Canada.8 2 Based on these bills the Royal Bank paid
several checks drawn by the Tinoco government.83 After the fall
of the Tinoco government, Costa Rica refused to honor the debt.84
This set of facts looks like corruption: Tinoco wanted the funds for
himself and the Royal Bank of Canada knew or should have
known of this intent.
Chief Justice Taft found in favor of Costa Rica. He held that
the position of the Royal Bank depended upon its good faith in the
payment of money for the real use of the Costa Rican government
under the Tinoco regime. 85 The Royal Bank had to show that it
provided the money to the government for its legitimate use.86
The claim failed because the Royal Bank knew the money was to
be used by Tinoco for his personal support after he had taken
refuge in another country, so the money was not for legitimate
government use.87
78 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 19.
79 See generally id. at 47 (noting the difference between state succession and
governmental succession in the context of discussions concerning odious debt).
80 See id. at 28, 41; see also Abrahams, supra note 22, at 46.

81 Tinoco Case (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 2 ANN. DIG. 34 (1923).
82 Id. at 34-35.
83 Id. at 35.
84 Id.

85 Id. at 36-39.
86 Id. at 39.

87 Tinoco Case, supra note 81, at 39.
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Applying the legal definition, the first limb-absence of
consent-may be satisfied because public money was applied for
private purposes by those in power. The second limb-absence of
benefit-would be satisfied because the funds were not put to a
legitimate use. The tribunal held that the third limb, creditor
awareness, was satisfied because the Royal Bank of Canada knew
that the money was to be used by Tinoco for his personal
support.8 8 However, the trigger event of state succession for
invoking the legal definition did not occur.89 Therefore, this
decision cannot be considered to support the Legal Approach
definition of odious debt as currently formulated. In this context,
it is worth noting that there is separate jurisprudence concerning
corruption. 90
2. World Duty Free Limited v. Republic of Kenya (2006)
As the most recent award concerning dictators' debts it is
worth discussing World Duty Free in detail. 9' In 1989, Kenya
concluded a contract with House of Perfume for the construction,
maintenance and operation of duty-free complexes at Nairobi and
Mombassa Airports.92 This agreement was amended in 1990 to
substitute World Duty Free (WDF) for House of Perfume. 93
WDF claimed that Kenya breached the Agreement by illegally
expropriating its properties and destroying its rights under the
Agreement.9 4
WDF sought restitution under a contractual
complaint exclusively arising from the House of Perfume contract,
or in the alternative, compensation. 95 Kenya submitted that the
Agreement was procured by paying a bribe of $2 million to the
then President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi. Payment of such a

88 Id.
89 There was no state sucession because the Tinoco government was not a
recognized government and was in fact actively non-recognized. Id. at 37-38.
90 See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing World Duty Free Limited v. Republic of Kenya,
a case deciding that a contract based on corruption is unenforceable).
91 World Duty Free Ltd. v. Rep. of Kenya, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/7
(Oct. 4, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.

92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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bribe was criminal so the resulting contract does not have the force
of law.9 6 It is unenforceable and the claims cannot be heard as a
matter of public policy. In addition, as a matter of applicable law,
the contract was voidable and was validly avoided by Kenya.97
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) Tribunal discussed the existence of a bribe. 98 The CEO
and shareholder of WDF met the President to discuss establishing
the duty-free complexes. 99 He had been told by his contact that he
would be required to make a personal donation of $2,000,000 to
the President.'00 He took a briefcase containing $500,000 in cash
to the first meeting.' 0' The briefcase was placed against a wall and
when he opened the briefcase in the car after the meeting he found
it now contained maize. 10 2 His
contact told him that was a sign the
03
President liked the proposal. 1
Kenya submitted that the payment was a bribe.' 04 WDF
submitted that it was a gift of protocol or a personal donation
made to the President to be used for public purposes within the
framework of the Kenyan system of Harambee.' °5
The Tribunal held that the payments made on behalf of House
of Perfume could not be considered as a personal donation for
public purposes.' 0 6 They were made to obtain an audience with
the President and, above all, to obtain during that audience the
agreement of the President on the 0 contemplated
investment.17
8
bribe.
a
was
it
that
held
The Tribunal
96 Id.

97 World Duty Free, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.
98 Id.
99 Id.

100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 World Duty Free, $ 131, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006),

http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.
104 Id.

133.

105 Id.

106 Id.

136.

107 Id.

135.

108 Id.$ 136.
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The Tribunal discussed treatment of corruption in previous
arbitral awards, in treaties and by the General Assembly of the
United Nations. °9 It concluded that even where corruption was
common practice and the award of a contract without it was
difficult or impossible, tribunals had always refused to condone
the practice, and this Tribunal endorsed the same approach. " The
Tribunal stated that bribery is contrary to international public
policy so claims based on contracts of corruption or on contracts
obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by the Tribunal."11 The
Tribunal then considered English and Kenyan law and112 public
policy and found that neither system permitted corruption.
WDF argued that the bribe was a collateral contract or was at
least severable from the Agreement.113 The Tribunal rejected that
it was a collateral contract on the facts and in principle because the
bribe formed an intrinsic part of the transaction; without the bribe
there would have been no contract. It was irrelevant that the bribe
was not wholly initiated by WDF. 114
The President acted corruptly, to the detriment of Kenya and in
violation of Kenyan law. 5 There was no mechanism in English
or Kenyan law for attributing knowledge to the state (as the
otherwise innocent principal) of a state officer engaged as its agent
in bribery. 116
If the tests are applied, the first limb, absence of consent, is
satisfied, as the bribe was held to be in violation of Kenyan law.
The second limb, absence of benefit, may not be satisfied as, in the
absence of the bribe, it would be difficult to argue that a contract
to build substantial facilities at two major airports would be
against the interests of Kenya, and with the associated job creation
for the Kenyan people. The third limb, creditor awareness, would
109 World Duty Free,
138-155, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/oo7 (Oct. 4,
2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documentsfWDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.
110 Id.

156.

111 Id.
112 Id.

157.
179.

113 Id.I 111.
114 Id.

174-75.

115 World Duty Free Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, 185, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.
116 Id. 185.
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be satisfied as the CEO of WDF knew that he was expected to
make a personal donation.
As World Duty Free does not satisfy all three limbs of the test,
it does not meet the odious debt criteria. The Tribunal held that it
was the bribe that rendered the contract voidable, not that the
contractual debt was odious.'17 As with Tinoco, World Duty Free

does not support the Legal Approach definition of odious debt
because there was no state succession.
V. Is a Doctrine of Odious Debt a Customary Rule of
International Law?
The proponents of the Legal Approach argue that there is (a)
sufficient state practice and (b) opinio juris to establish odious
debt as a customary rule of international law." 8 These arguments
must be able to discharge the burdens described by the ICJ
necessary to become a customary rule of international law. This
returns us to the discussion of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
ICJ.
A. State Practice
The ICJ has established that the threshold for state practice is
that there is a uniform and extensive practice regarding odious
debt amongst the states concerned, with exceptions treated as
breaches of the rule." 9 Any abstention from seeking to recover a
debt must be from a belief that recovery would be unlawful, unless
the abstention is by one state that has consistently refused to apply
the rule.' 20
The examples cited in support of the Political Approach are the
same as those cited for the Legal Approach so the same criticisms
of sparse and antique evidence must be addressed again.' 2 ' The
first example cited is Cuba 1898 and the most recent before World
Duty Free is the Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission decision
of 1947. These examples cover some fifty years. However, there

117 Id.T 183.

118 See, e.g., Abrahams, supra note 22, at 50.
119 MALCOLM

N.

SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW

120

Id. at 71.

121

See discussion supra part III.

70 (5th ed., 2003)
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is virtually no state practice cited for the sixty years since World
War II.
The lack of examples since 1945 is surprising given that the
and
the
dissolutions
of
the
Soviet
decolonization
Union,Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia have all occurred during
this time. There were numerous opportunities for a doctrine to be
applied, with most examples falling within the hostile debts
category, but a lack of practice. Set against this silence is the
restructuring activity of the Paris Club and the London Club.'22
The number of post-decolonization dictators also presented
opportunities for successor governments to develop and invoke a
doctrine of odious debts. Indonesia and Nigeria are examples of
states that might have tried to invoke a doctrine but did not.'23
Again this reluctance can be contrasted against restructuring
activity involving both states, with Nigeria involved in five Paris
Club treatments since 1986124 and Indonesia in eight since 1966.125

Creditor states have also consistently sought to recover debts.
There have been 405 Paris Club restructuring deals since 1956
involving 83 debtor states. 126 None of the examples cited can be
placed without doubt into the Legal Approach definition of odious
debt. The most convincing example on its facts, Tinoco, is
excluded because there was no state succession and the Cuban and

122 The Paris Club and London Club are known for many sovereign debt
restructurings. Most recently, in 2004, the Paris Club decided to write-off the debts of
Iraq. Press Release, Club de Paris, The Paris Club and the Republic of Iraq Agree on
Debt Relief (Nov. 21, 2004), www.clubdeparis.org (click on "Press Releases" hyperlink,
then scroll down to find "Iraq" hyperlink).
123 Much of Nigeria's debt can be considered odious given the fact that the original
loans were made to authoritarian regimes, many of which were then looted. Rather than
pursue an odious debt resolution, the countries decided to work through the restructuring
activity of the Paris and London club. See Lies Leba, Compassionate Debt Relief or
Paris Club 419, VANGUARD (Lagos),
Dec.
12,
2005,
available at
http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfmDSP=content&ContentlD= 14357.
See generally Description of the Paris Club, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/quisommes-nous (describing the restructuring activities of the club in general).
124 Paris
Club,
Nigeria:
List
of
the
Debt
Treatments,
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/pays/nigeria (last visited May 1, 2007).
125 Paris
Club,
Indonesia:
List
of
the
Debt
Treatments,
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/pays/indonesie (last visited May 1, 2007).
126 Paris Club, Key Figures, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/services/
chiffres-cles.
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Boer debt examples create such a paradox that they appear to be
mutually exclusive. There are fundamental questions against at
least one limb of the definition for the other examples cited so that
it appears that there is no state practice to support the definition as
'
formulated. 27
It can be concluded confidently that the threshold of state
practice has not been met. The absence of states asserting a
doctrine of odious debts, the lack of state practice that can be
shown to support the Legal Approach definition, combined with
the evidence of creditor states seeking to assert claims, shows that
the overwhelming state practice is that sovereign debt is
recoverable. The examples cited are therefore best viewed as
isolated exceptions arising from peculiar circumstances which
have not been followed as precedents.
B. Opinio Juris
Supporters of the Legal Approach must also show that states
have acted consistently with a doctrine of odious debt because this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.' 28 The same criticisms of the examples cited as state
practice can be levelled at those cited as opinio juris; they are
isolated examples of mainly historic interest. 129 Even staunch
supporters, such as Abrahams, accept that "it has to be admitted
that proof of opiniojurisis difficult to produce."' 3 °
Others cite such evidence as Article 38 of the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property
1983,1' which provides that no debt passes to successor states
unless there is a positive agreement to that effect. 3 2 However, the
Convention has not entered into force and an express reference to

127 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 1-2 (the three limbs of the test are absence of
consent, absence of benefit, and creditor awareness.)
128 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-11 (1998).

129 Of all the restructuring deals discussed supra note 137 that could possibly be
used to argue the strength of an opiniojuris approach to odious debt, each is an isolated
incident giving no clear cut support for this perspective.
130 See Abrahams, supra note 22, at 50.
131 See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, at 306.
132 Id.
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odious debt was removed from the first draft.133 Reference is also
made to international materials on corruption.'3 4 However, the
ICSID Tribunal in World Duty Free did not even discuss a
doctrine of odious debt nor is it mentioned in the reported
an extensive discussion of international
submissions, despite
35
bribery.1
on
policy
The Tribunal left open the possibility for a non-contractual,
proprietary, or restitutionary claim, as WDF had not pleaded those
claims. 136 The existence of any of these claims would not be
consistent with the suggested doctrine of odious debt, as it would
allow the creditor some protection rather than the right of the
debtor unilaterally to walk away from the debt.
The Legal Approach definition of odious debt is not accepted
as a rule of international law; as has been demonstrated, it does not
even come close to satisfying the requirements in this respect. As
discussed above, the consistent practice through the last sixty
years has been for sovereign debts to be repaid.' 37 Even in World
Duty Free the Tribunal suggested that a financial remedy would be
available to the claimant, despite the bribe, had it made the correct
pleadings. 138 The uniformity of practice, especially when
considered in the context of the erosion of absolute state immunity
to allow sovereigns to be pursued through the courts, is persuasive
evidence of an opinio juris that sovereign debt obligations should
be respected and protected.
This approach is also consistent with the established rule of
international law that foreign property cannot be appropriated by a
state without appropriate compensation.' 39 Since a debt is a choice
in action it is a form of property, so the rights of the creditor are
protected by international law. 40 The award in World Duty Free
133 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 33.
134 Id. at 34.
135 World Duty Free, T 107, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.
136 Id. T 179.
137 See discussion, supra Part V.A.
138 World Duty Free, [ 179, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006),

http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf.
139 SHAW, supra note 119, at 905.
140 Id. (indicating that private rights obtained by foreign nationals continue after
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tests a limit of that right when the right was acquired through
bribery. The right was held to be severely curtailed but the
Tribunal left open only the possibility of a non-contractual,
proprietary or restitutionary claim, and so rights of the creditor
were not totally extinguished."' The protection of property rights
from sovereigns is further evidence of opinio juris requiring
sovereigns to honor obligations.
The Centre for International Sustainable Development argues
that the relationship between government and state is that of agent
and principal, so the actions of the corrupt agent should not be
attributable to the innocent principal. 142 The ICSID Tribunal in
World Duty Free used an agency analogy to avoid imputing
knowledge of the bribe to Kenya. 143 The agency analogy may
have a practical application to situations such as that in World
Duty Free where a contract was won through bribery. 144
The final observation is that most jurisdictions in developed
countries have made corruption and bribery unlawful. Where
corruption is involved in a contractual arrangement, the purported
"rights" of the parties are adversely affected whether there is a
debt claim or not. This is established law in many jurisdictions,
but it has nothing to do with odious debts in legal terms. Most
cases are between private parties and have been applied in a
sovereign context.
VI. Conclusion
A review of the literature on odious debt reveals two
approaches: the Political Approach and the more sophisticated
Legal Approach. The Political Approach is not a theory that can
be subjected to serious legal analysis because it is not based on
legal principles. The Legal Approach is the product of a more
sophisticated legal analysis to attempt to prove that a customary
rule of international law exists in respect to odious debt. After
considering Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ and the
jurisprudence of the Court on the formation of customary rules of
state succession and can be enforced against the new sovereign).
141 WorldDuty Free, supra note 91, at 179.
142 See CISDL, supra note 33, at 36.
143 World Duty Free, supra note 91, paras. 184-85.
144 Id., para. 174.
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international law, it must be concluded that neither the threshold
for state practice nor opinio juris have been met. Consequently, it
has been demonstrated that the Legal Approach definition of
odious debt is not accepted as a rule of international law.
A separate, established body of law exists in many
jurisdictions in relation to corruption and bribery.
Where
corruption is involved in a contractual arrangement, the purported
"rights" of the parties are adversely affected. This body of law has
nothing to do with odious debts, but has been applied in a
sovereign context, notably by the ICSID Tribunal in World Duty
Free.
The question of whether there is a recognized legal doctrine of
odious debt, therefore, must be answered in the negative. If there
is no rule of odious debt in international law, there can be no scope
for legitimate repudiation of sovereign debt as odious.
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